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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The factors that should be considered in a court's 
determination of a counsel fee award and the procedure to 
be used in that connection, issues that occupied all levels 
of the federal judiciary for numerous years, havefinally 
been resolved through a series of decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. The question before us is whether, 
after all the effort that went into that resolution, we will 
allow the courts of this circuit to bypass the Supreme 
Court's explicit directions merely because counsel failed to 




Before us is an appeal by the Pennsylvania 
Environmental Defense Foundation ("PEDF"), a non-profit 
environmental action group, from an order of the district 
court awarding it attorneys' fees following the entry of a 
consent decree in its suit against Canon-McMillan School 
District under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1365. 
 
PEDF, which had sent the School District its detailed 
statutorily required Notice of Intent to Sue on August 20, 
1993, brought suit on March 30, 1994, alleging that there 
were "repeated violations" of the terms of the School 
District's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
permit because of discharges from the Wylandville 
Elementary School sewage system into a tributary of Little 
Chartiers Creek in North Strabane Township, Pennsylvania. 
PEDF alleged that the violations were damaging the creek 
in violation of 33 U.S.C. SS 1311(a) and 1342 and sought 
injunctive relief, civil penalties and costs. PEDF was not the 
only entity concerned about this pollution. The 
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources 
("DER") had renewed the School District's NPDES permit on 
March 17, 1994. DER also informed the School District of 
measures it needed to take to come into compliance with its 
permit limits. The Environmental Protection Agency, which 
had been conducting a contemporaneous investigation, 
submitted a Notice of Proposed Assessment of a Civil 
Penalty against the School District on August 30, 1994 and 
also directed it to come into compliance. 
 
After the School District made what it referred to as 
several "minor process adjustments," it was apparently in 
full compliance with all of its permit limits by January 
1995. On February 16, 1995, the School Districtfiled both 
a Motion for Stay and a Motion for a Protective Order, 
arguing that the litigation should be stayed and discovery 
halted because it was in complete compliance with its 
permit. The district court denied those motions on February 
22, 1995, and PEDF continued with its preparation. In 
March of 1995, the district court granted PEDF's motion to 
file a reply brief to the School District's memorandum in 
opposition to PEDF's motion for partial summary judgment. 
PEDF filed that reply brief on March 23, 1995. 
 
Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement and 
submitted to the district court a Consent Decree, which it 
signed on June 23, 1995. The settlement reserved the issue 
of the award of attorneys' fees, and shortly thereafter PEDF 
filed a motion for attorneys' fees and submitted a statement 
of fees and expenses. The district court held oral argument 
on the fees and then issued an order on December 2, 1996 
that directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The court's order stated, inter alia: 
 
       [E]ach party shall submit a proposed order which shall 
       set forth, in specific detail, its proposal for completely 
       resolving this issue. The court will adopt as its own the 
       proposed findings and sign, without modification, the 
       one proposed order which, in the judgment of the court, 
       is most reasonable under the circumstances. 
 
App. at 94 (emphasis in original). Neither party objected to 
this order, and both filed the required proposedfindings 
and conclusions. 
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PEDF's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
requested a total of $70,282.09. It arrived at thatfigure by 
the formula set out in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 
(1983), through calculating a "lodestar" based on a 
proposed "reasonable hourly rate" of $160 per hour for 
attorney John E. Childe and $60 per hour for Paralegal 
Cindy Smith, multiplied by "hours reasonably expended." 
App. at 95, 118. PEDF submitted a detailed account of 
these charges and accompanying time slips. The School 
District's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
suggested the much lower fee of $20,414.62. The district 
court adopted verbatim the School District's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, except that it 
submitted its own short introduction. It follows that 
although we will refer to the court's order, it must be 
remembered that the "order" is in fact in the language 
prepared by the School District. 
 
Although the order was highly critical of certain aspects 
of PEDF's fee request, including the proposed rates and the 
expenditure of time on certain issues, it did not explicitly 
reduce the hours that PEDF billed for these services. 
Instead, it was keyed to the determination that PEDF was 
entitled to no fee for the period after which the School 
District was in "full compliance." It stated,"By January of 
1995, it is thus undisputed that no further violations were 
occurring at the Wylandville Elementary School system, 
and the expenditure of $18,000 for structural modifications 
assured that the problems would not recur . . . . By its own 
calculations, PEDF had expended $8,963 in attorney's fees 
as of the date when the Wylandville Elementary School 
system was in full compliance. . . ." D.C. Opinion at 7. On 
the basis that PEDF had needlessly pursued the litigation 
after January 1995, after the violations had been abated, 
the order adopted by the district court granted PEDF all of 
the attorneys' fees it had requested for the time period 
through January 1995, but no fees for time spent after that 
date, except for $1,910 in connection with the consent 
decree. It also awarded PEDF $3,000 for fees in connection 
with the fee litigation and $6,541.62 in costs. D.C. Opinion 
at 21-22. 
 
The order, in language stemming from the School 
District, concluded that "the total of $20,414.62 is 
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generous under the circumstances, and, although the facts 
and law relating to duplicative billing, hourly rates and 
degree of difficulty would justify a reduction of this amount, 
the Court will award this amount at this time." D.C. 
Opinion at 22. We have jurisdiction over PEDF's appeal 




The award of attorneys' fees in this case is authorized 
under the citizens' suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 
which provides that a court "may award costs of litigation 
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to 
any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever 
the court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C. 
S 1365(d). The statute places no restriction on the award 
other than that the party entitled to the award be 
"prevailing or substantially prevailing." 
 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted the 
approach first set forth in this court's opinions in Lindy 
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), and Lindy 
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976), with respect to 
the appropriate procedure and considerations for a district 
court to follow in awarding attorneys' fees. Central to the 
Supreme Court's decisions has been its adoption of the 
"lodestar" formula, which requires multiplying the number 
of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly 
rate. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989); 
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 564; Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Hensley , 461 U.S. at 
433. 
 
The "starting point" in determining the appropriate 
hourly rate is the attorneys' usual billing rate. Public 
Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 
1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has directed 
that the district court should then consider the"prevailing 
market rates" in the relevant community. Blum , 465 U.S. at 
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895 (1984); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 
(1989). In calculating the second part of the lodestar 
determination, the time reasonably expended, "[t]he district 
court should review the time charged, decide whether the 
hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the 
particular purposes described and then exclude those that 
are `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.' " 
Windall, 51 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 
433-34). Once the court has calculated the lodestar it may 
adjust that amount, primarily based on the degree of 
success that the plaintiff obtained. See Hensley , 461 U.S. 
at 435. However, the cases make clear that before any 
adjustments are made, the district court must calculate a 
lodestar. See Windall, 51 F.3d at 1190. 
 
In Windall, this court considered a district court's award 
of attorneys' fees under S 1365(d) of the Clean Water Act, 
which presented a situation where the public interest group 
plaintiffs had been awarded injunctive relief but no 
monetary damages. The district court had applied a 50 
percent negative multiplier to the lodestar because of the 
failure to obtain monetary relief. Id. at 1189. On appeal, we 
held that the use of the negative multiplier was error, 
rejecting the "rough mathematical" approach applied by the 
district court. Id. at 1189-90. 
 
Throughout the opinion we emphasized the importance of 
adherence to the formulaic approach set out by the 
Supreme Court. At the outset, we stated that the amount of 
a fee award is within the district court's discretion "so long 
as it `employs correct standards and procedures and makes 
findings of fact not clearly erroneous.' " Id. at 1184 
(emphasis added) (quoting Northeast Women's Ctr. v. 
McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1989)). Thus, we 
held that rather than apply the across-the-board 
percentage reduction reflecting its view of the result 
achieved, the district court should have considered the 
relationship between the degree of success and the amount 
of the award. That step could only be taken after the court 
had calculated the lodestar. "It is, however, essential to 
calculate the lodestar before considering adjustments. Only 
after the lodestar is determined does the district court have 
discretion to consider results obtained and, in doing so, to 
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exclude some or all of the time spent on unsuccessful 
claims." Id. at 1190. 
 718<!>We also stressed the importance of the court's 
 
articulation of the basis for the award. We stated that the 
district court must "provide a concise but clear explanation 
of its reasons for [a] fee award.' " Id. at 1188 (quoting 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). The defendant in Windall had 
contended in its cross-appeal that the district court had 
failed to consider some of its specific objections regarding 
the hours expended. In response, we stated, 
 
       [t]he magistrate judge did not consider the Air Force's 
       objections to particular time charges. The magistrate 
       judge was reluctant to second guess counsel's 
       judgments about what time and attention particular 
       legal problems should be given. Hensley, however, 
       directs district courts to consider a party's objections 
       to particular time charges and make their findings on 
       the hours that should be included in calculating the 
       lodestar. The district court failed to make any such 
       findings here. 
 
Id. at 1189. Our view of the necessary procedure was made 
explicit in the passage in which we stated, "[t]he district 
court seems to have thought that its negative multiplier 
made attention to the Air Force's specific objections 
unnecessary. Hensley does not permit such a short cut." Id. 
at 1189 n.14 (emphasis added). 
 
The Supreme Court continued to follow the lodestar 
approach after Hensley, but emphasized that the district 
court was permitted to adjust the fee depending on the 
situation. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council , 478 U.S. 
at 565. However, in the case before us, the district court 
decided to dispense with that process, which may be 
arduous and is often adversarial, and determined in 
advance to adopt the findings and conclusions of one party 
or the other "without modification." App. at 94. That 
procedure forced each party to adjust its submission 
because of the knowledge that the district court would only 
choose one of the two options. In effect, the district court 
conducted a variation of a "silent auction," with the parties 
bidding against themselves and each other. While there is 
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nothing wrong with encouraging a party who seeks a fee to 
compromise its request, there is no justification for the use 
of the "silent auction" procedure in setting a statutory fee 
and no party has cited any authority which would allow it. 
The instances in which courts may not have followed the 
lodestar approach have been, as far as we know, instances 
where the parties have reached an agreement as to the 
amount of fee. Regrettably, such a resolution was not 
reached in this case. 
 
In support of the procedure used by the district court, 
the School District refers us to our opinion in Lansford- 
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d 
Cir. 1993), where we stated that "a district court's findings, 
when adopted verbatim from a party's proposed findings, do 
not demand more stringent scrutiny on appeal." Id. at 
1215. We adhere to our own precedent, notwithstanding 
other views on this issue. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Cedar 
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 574 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating on 
review of an order assessing a penalty, that "the court 
adopted Sierra Club's proposed findings and conclusions 
with minimal revision. Under such circumstances, we 
review the court's findings of fact with caution"); In re 
Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 274-75 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(citing cases admonishing trial courts for verbatim adoption 
of proposed order drafted by litigants). 
 
Our concern here goes beyond the verbatim adoption of 
a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
We agree with the court in Odeco, Inc. v. Avondale 
Shipyards, Inc., 663 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), that the 
"mere fact" that a district court adopts a party's factual 
findings verbatim "does not itself indict them." What is key 
is whether those findings are in fact reflective of the district 
court's views. Thus, such a verbatim adoption was 
acceptable to the appellate court in Odeco because "[t]he 
record reflects that the trial court fully comprehended the 
factual and legal issues and adequately performed the 
decision reaching process." Id. at 652-53 (citation omitted). 
The central issue is whether the district court has made an 
independent judgment. See In re Colony Square , 819 F.2d 
at 275-76. 
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In this case, because the circumstances underlying the 
entry of the order are clear from the record, we cannot 
presume that the district court made an independent 
judgment about the law and then decided that one party's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law precisely 
expressed its judgment. Instead, because the court 
announced in advance it would use this procedure, we 
cannot discount the possibility that the district court may 
not have agreed in totality with the findings of fact or legal 
conclusions in either of the proposals, but chose one simply 
because it came closest to its own view. While this course 
of action may have facilitated the decision for the district 
court, it is not only contrary to the established procedure 
for awarding attorneys' fees but also offends our belief that 
a judge's findings and conclusions should represent that 




The School District concedes that the procedure used by 
the district court did not adhere to the steps directed by the 
Supreme Court for fixing of a contested counsel fee. 
Instead, the School District argues that PEDF waived its 
objection to any defects in the procedure by failing to object 
when it was announced by the district court. It is an 
argument that is not without some merit. In the usual 
circumstance, a party's failure to object will result in waiver 
of an issue on appeal. See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 
981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, PEDF did not 
interpose any objection to the district court's 
announcement that it would set the fee by accepting one 
party's submission or the other. Notwithstanding PEDF's 
attempt at justification and rationalization, the fact remains 
that it did not object. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our dissenting colleague notes that we cite no authority that 
disapproves the district court's "either/or" protocol. As far as we know, 
in no other case has a district court applied that procedure, and 
certainly not in connection with fixing a disputed attorney's fee subject 
to a Supreme Court's instruction on the procedure to be followed. What 
may be appropriate for baseball salary arbitration is not necessarily 
appropriate for the law courts. 
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Nonetheless, we have recognized that the concept of plain 
error may be applied in the civil context despite the lack of 
objection when a district court has committed a serious 
and flagrant error that jeopardized the integrity of the 
proceeding. See generally Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
126 F.3d 506, 520-21 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 1516 (1998). The clear deviation from an established 
legal rule can qualify as plain error. Of course, this is a 
power we exercise only "sparingly." See Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 
993-94 (3d Cir. 1996). In this instance, because the 
manner in which the order was entered goes to the heart of 
the judicial process, we will address the procedure, 
notwithstanding PEDF's lack of objection. In doing so, we 
do not condone PEDF's failure to bring before the district 
court its lack of approval of the course on which the court 
was embarking, and its silence may have, and probably did, 
mislead the district court. 
 
Once we review the court's ruling, the error is plain. 
There can be no serious dispute that PEDF qualified as the 
"prevailing party." It follows that the district court should 
have first decided the reasonable hourly rate based on the 
"prevailing market rate" rule and multiplied that rate by the 
time reasonably expended to obtain the "lodestar." The 
court should have then made adjustments, if any, based at 
least in part on the degree of success of the litigation. 
 
Regarding the hourly rate, the district court's order 
stated that "PEDF's proposed hourly rate is high even by 
Pittsburgh standards. Plaintiff's counsel, whose office is in 
Hummelstown, a small community near Harrisburg, has 
not offered any evidence that the typical hourly rate for 
legal services to public non-profit organizations in his 
community exceeds $80.00 per hour." D.C. Opinion at 
14-15. Despite this comment, the court allowed the hourly 
rate requested through January of 1995. Similarly, 
although the order questions the propriety of time claimed 
in the PEDF fee petition in several respects, such as failing 
to apportion time for preparation of the complaint in this 
case with that spent in drafting a similar complaintfiled by 
PEDF, the court never found what was a reasonable time 
for each task. Instead the court apparently made the 
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adjustments it may have believed desirable by accepting the 
School District's proposed "cut-off" date for the entire 
action. PEDF points out that this is inconsistent with the 
court's rulings after that date which rejected the School 
District's request for a stay and which authorized, even if it 
did not necessarily encourage, further action by PEDF. 
 
The School District argues that the district court order 
does implicitly calculate a "lodestar" by adopting the rate of 
$160 and $60 per hour from PEDF's original fee petition, 
and multiplying that by the amount of hours expended 
before January of 1995. We find this assertion 
unpersuasive because it requires us to make assumptions 
that have no support in the order which, contrary to 
adopting the lodestar, contains statements questioning the 
components of a calculated lodestar. 
 
Nor is there any indication that the district court made a 
separate calculation for fees in connection with the fee 
petition, as required by Windall. 51 F.3d at 1190. PEDF 
had sought $12,802 for preparing its original fee petition 
and $8,560 for preparation of the proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The order awarded PEDF $3,000. 
This figure is never explained in terms of the required 
separate calculation of a lodestar for the fees in connection 
with the fee petition and a subsequent adjustment to that 
figure based on the allowed criteria. The order merely states 
that the fees requested were unreasonable and notes that 
the request for fees in preparing the fee request is nearly 25 
percent of the total fee request and may be duplicative of 
requests in other litigation. That explanation is not 
sufficient to constitute compliance with the direction of 
Windall. 
 
The School District contends that even if the district 
court failed to employ the correct legal principles, it was 
"harmless." It argues that if the district court had 
calculated a lodestar, and then made an adjustment, PEDF 
would have received a lesser amount than it did, and thus 
PEDF did not suffer from the district court's possible error. 
We reject this contention because it is speculative. We 
simply cannot know from this record what the court would 
have done. 
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Both parties have addressed the merits of the amount 
ultimately awarded. We do not reach that issue. Instead, we 
will await such time as we have a district court order that 
follows the accepted protocol. Were it not for the 
importance of the issue raised in this case we would be 
most reluctant to visit this satellite litigation again on the 
district court. It would be preferable were the parties to 
resolve the remaining issue by negotiation or mediation, a 




For the above reasons, we will reverse the order of the 
district court awarding attorneys' fees to PEDF, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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Garth, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The district court utilized a novel procedure to determine 
the amount of attorneys' fees to which Appellant PEDF, as 
the prevailing party, was entitled. Neither PEDF nor the 
School District ever objected to this procedure, although 
they were afforded ample time and opportunity to do so. 
Notwithstanding this fact, PEDF now appeals the use of the 




I must dissent from the opinion of the panel majority for 
two (2) fundamental reasons. 
 
First, PEDF acquiesced to the district court's procedure, 
and therefore waived its right to raise this issue on appeal. 
PEDF admittedly understood the district court's"either/or" 
and "without modification" order, and nevertheless, 
strategically chose not to object. The authority cited by the 
majority requiring a lodestar calculation has no relevance 
to this case. Here, both parties had waived all objection to 
the district court's order. Viewed in this light, I do not feel 
that the majority has satisfactorily explained why PEDF 
should be permitted to recant its previous acquiescence of 
the district court's protocol, particularly where no 
substantial rights of any parties have been implicated. 
 
Second, the majority has not explained why cases where 
the calculation of the lodestar amount is disputed should 
govern cases such as this case where it is the procedure 
giving rise to the attorneys' fee award itself -- and not the 
calculation pursuant to the lodestar formula -- that is at 
issue. The majority has cited no authority holding that 
procedures of this kind (in this case, the district court's 
"either/or" and "without modification" order of December 2, 
1996) are illegal. Parties can agree to an attorneys' fee 
award, and the majority acknowledges that such 
agreements are not governed by the lodestar calculus. The 
majority fails to explain, however, why the parties cannot 
also agree to the procedure that the district court employs 
in determining those fees. 
 
By holding that the lodestar formula must be employed 
even in the absence of an objection, the majority effectively 
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holds that the lodestar analysis must be utilized in every 
attorneys' fee application that comes before the district 
courts of this Circuit. Thus, according to the majority, 
parties can agree to a fee outside the reach of the lodestar, 
but they cannot agree to an alternative procedure to 
determine those fees. 
 
As I believe this is no precedent for this unjustified and 




The facts are simple and straightforward: 
 
(1) The parties reached a settlement agreement aft er one 
year of litigation, and memorialized their agreement in a 
consent decree. The consent decree did not resolve the 
issue of attorneys' fees, but instead left that issue for the 
district court to address. 
 
(2) On December 2, 1996, the district court issued  an 
order directing each party to submit its proposedfindings 
of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of 
attorneys' fees. That order provided: 
 
       [E]ach party shall submit a proposed order which shall 
       set forth, in specific detail, its proposal for completely 
       resolving this issue. The court will adopt as its own the 
       proposed findings and sign, without modification, the 
       one proposed order which, in the judgment of the court, 
       is the most reasonable under the circumstances. 
 
Order, Dec. 2, 1996 (emphasis in original). 
 
(3) On February 13, 1997, the district court adopt ed 
without modification the School District's proposed 
findings. 
 
(4) Although nearly two and a half months had elap sed 
from the time the district court established the protocol to 
which both parties acquiesced and the time the court 
announced its decision, at no time did either party object to 
the district court's order. 
 
(5) On February 24, 1997, PEDF filed a Motion fo r 
Reconsideration, but in that motion still did not object to 
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the "either/or" and "without modification" protocol that the 
district court had adopted. 
 
(6) During oral argument,1 coun sel for PEDF conceded 
that he understood the district court's December 2, 1996, 
order as proposing an "either/or" situation:"either (the 
district court) was going to accept our proposedfindings or 
he was going to accept the School District's." According to 




I believe that PEDF has waived its right to pursue this 
appeal on the basis of the procedure utilized by the district 
court in determining attorneys' fees. At oral argument, 
counsel for PEDF conceded that he understood the district 
court's adopted procedure and the ramifications of that 
procedure. PEDF acknowledged that "there was no 
question" that the district court would either accept PEDF's 
proposed findings and fee award or it would accept the 
School District's proposed findings and fee award. Thus, 
PEDF made a strategic decision not to object to the district 
court's proposed procedure in the hope that the district 
court might accept its -- PEDF's -- proposal without 
modification instead of accepting the School District's. 
 
That PEDF's deliberate choice not to object to the district 
court's procedure subsequently turned out to have been 
disadvantageous cannot be a basis for reversing the district 
court's decision. See Bivens Garden Office Bldg., Inc. v. 
Barnett Banks, 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
plaintiffs waived the issue of the district court's recusal 
when the plaintiffs strategically decided not to raise the 
recusal issue before trial despite their awareness of facts 
upon which the motion for recusal would have been based). 
Indeed, it was only after the district court adopted the 
School District's proposed findings that PEDF-- for the first 
time -- complained by filing a Motion for Reconsideration, 
and even in that motion PEDF did not identify the district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. These concessions were made during the first oral argument held on 
January 21, 1998. The panel was reconstituted and a second argument 
held after Judge Lewis fell ill. 
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court's procedure as the gravamen of its complaint. Quite 
simply, by not objecting, PEDF waived its right to appeal 
the district court's attorneys' fee procedure. See Fleck v. 
KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In Continental Casualty Co. v. D'Andrea, Inc. , ___ F.3d 
___, 1998 WL 381721 (3d Cir. July 10, 1998), this Court 
recently upheld a magistrate judge's attorney fee sanction 
of $38,000 where no objection or appeal to the district 
court had been taken by counsel. In Continental , the 
magistrate judge required the defendant, D'Andrea, to pay 
his opposing party's attorneys' fees and costs for additional 
discovery as a condition to permitting D'Andrea to amend 
his answer nearly two (2) years after the original answer 
had been filed. 
 
D'Andrea did not object to the magistrate judge's 
condition, and at no time did he raise the issue for review 
before the district court. In speaking for the Court, Judge 
Rosenn concluded that in the absence of an objection, 
D'Andrea accepted the condition imposed upon him in 
exchange for the privilege to amend his answer. See id. at 
6. Judge Rosenn reasoned, as I do now, that the failure to 
object for strategical reasons constituted a waiver. See id. 
("Presumably, [D'Andrea's counsel] reasoned that, even with 
the imposition of the attorneys' fees and costs, it was 
strategic for his client to pay them under the 
circumstances.") 
 
Furthermore, even if D'Andrea had not accepted the 
magistrate judge's condition, in terms as applicable to the 
case at hand as they were to Continental, Judge Rosenn 
commented that this Court should not interfere with a 
lower court ruling in the absence of an objection because 
such procedures 
 
       would allow a party to sandbag the district court and 
       other parties by allowing or inviting the court to make 
       an error and then springing the issue on the other 
       party on appeal. See 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. 
       Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure S 2472, at 93-95 
       (1995). Explicit opposition to or an objection on the 
       record to a proposed order permits the court to 
       consider the position of the opposing party and modify, 
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       or even possibly abandon, the order in light of the 
       arguments raised. 
 
Continental, 1998 WL 381721, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 
In the present case, PEDF knew and accepted the fact 
that the district court was not going to engage in any 
adjustments or make any of its own computations when 
determining the appropriate fee in this case, as it very well 
might have done if PEDF had objected to the district court's 
procedure and the court had then employed a traditional 
lodestar approach under Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424 (1983). Given the district court's explicit language in its 
December 2, 1996 order, and counsel for PEDF's 
acknowledged understanding of that language, it was 
incumbent upon PEDF to make its position known at that 
time and object to the "either/or" and"without 
modification" procedure if it opposed such a protocol. It did 
not. The benefit of hindsight cannot change this procedural 
infirmity. 
 
Furthermore, the majority has turned a blind eye toward 
the strict standards that a litigant must satisfy to seek 
review under our "plain error" jurisprudence. Under the 
plain error standard, three requirements must be met: 
(1) there must be an actual error -- a deviation  from or 
violation of a legal rule; (2) the error must be p lain -- i.e., 
clear and obvious under current law; and (3) the e rror 
must affect substantial rights. See Walden v. Georgia-Pac. 
Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 520-21 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1516 (1998) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)); see also Fleck, 981 F.2d at 116 
(stating that the error must be "fundamental and highly 
prejudicial" that results in a "miscarriage of justice" to 
warrant a reversal when party did not object during 
proceeding below). It has been our practice to exercise our 
power to reverse for plain error sparingly. See Walden, 126 
F.3d at 520. 
 
In this case, not only was there no error -- let alone plain 
error -- in the district court's choice of protocol, as I 
discuss below, but the majority has not explained how the 
district court's order affected PEDF's "substantial rights" or 
resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." Instead, the majority 
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has by-passed this critical element of "plain error" review 
by announcing that the district court's alleged error 
"jeopardized the integrity of the proceeding." Majority Op. at 
10. In so stating, the majority has failed to appreciate the 
fact that jeopardizing the integrity of a proceeding is only 
meaningful in the context of the substantial rights that 
were supposedly prejudiced. 
 
In this case, PEDF received $20,414.62, instead of the 
$70,282.09 it had requested. Apart from the fact that no 
one can predict that PEDF will receive a different fee award 
after the majority's remand,2 the majority cites no authority 
holding that the nature of attorneys' fees and the amounts 
involved here implicate PEDF's substantial rights and result 
in manifest injustice such that we should exercise our 
review under the plain error doctrine. Indeed, I am 
compelled to point out that the majority has cited no 
authority at all which would in any way repudiate the 
protocol utilized by the district court. Accordingly, I would 




My second basis of contention with the majority stems 
from the fact that there is simply nothing illegal or 
improper about the procedure the district court employed 
for determining attorneys' fees. Citing only inapposite 
attorneys' fee appeals -- inapposite because as noted 
above, none of the cases cited in the majority opinion 
involve a dispute over the district court's procedure -- the 
majority of this Court reverses the district court for 
implementing a procedure that has never been disapproved 
by any court. While the majority has acknowledged that 
where the parties have agreed to a particular attorneys' fee, 
their agreement need not follow nor comply with the 
lodestar approach delineated in Hensley v. Eckerhart and 
its progeny, it has refused to recognize that PEDF's failure 
to object to the protocol ordered in this case was 
tantamount to an acceptance of the outcome of that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We defer to the district court's discretion in making fee awards. See 
Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
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procedure. That acceptance by PEDF and the School 
District is not one whit different in substance than an 
agreement by the parties to a particular fee arrangement. 
 
In the case before us, the majority has cited and 
discussed only cases where the parties have contested the 
calculation of the lodestar, not the use  of the lodestar 
formula itself. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (contesting lodestar 
calculation based on the enhancement of a fee for superior 
performance by opposing counsel); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424 (1983) (reversing district court's lodestar 
calculation because court failed to consider the relationship 
between the success of the prevailing party and the amount 
of the fees granted); Public Interest Research Group v. 
Windall, 51 F.3d 1179 (3d Cir. 1995) (contesting district 
court's lodestar calculation applying negative multiplier, 
using incorrect market as basis for hourly rate, failing to 
deduct duplicative and excessive time). The calculation of 
the lodestar, however, has nothing to do with cases where 
the parties have either consented to a particular fee (i.e., a 
fee agreement) or have agreed to a particular formula 
utilized by a district court in order to determine that fee, 
such as the formula adopted by the district court here. 
 
When parties settle the issue of outstanding fees, it is 
without our realm to instruct them how to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable amount. If the amount of attorneys' 
fees is accepted by all parties, no case in controversy exists 
for us to exercise judicial oversight or judicial review 
regardless of how those fees were ultimately determined or 
what procedure or principle, if any, the parties employed in 
their calculations. When the parties consent or stipulate to 
a fee award, they are necessarily consenting to the 
procedure employed to derive that award even though that 
procedure may not have involved a traditional lodestar 
analysis. It is not within our province to question the 
consensual nature of that agreement. 
 
By the same token, there is no difference between the 
protocol that was employed by the district court in this case 
without objection -- i.e., accepting one of the party's 
proposed findings without modification -- and the means 
by which both parties typically settle or agree upon 
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attorneys' fees. In the latter instance where the parties 
agree on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to the 
successful party, the parties rarely, if ever, employ a 
traditional lodestar calculation. Moreover, in each instance 
-- where no objection is raised to a particular method 
proposed by the district court for its fee determination, or 
where all parties agree on the amount of fees to be awarded 
-- no lodestar analysis is indicated, nor, contrary to the 
majority's assertions, must it be utilized. In both situations 
-- agreement to the procedure or agreement to the fees 
themselves -- the award is valid irrespective of the protocol 
used and must be upheld.3 
 
Yet, the Court has now held that unless the lodestar 
approach is used, any attorneys' fee determination made by 
the district court is illegal. Not only does this conclusion 
fail to account for those cases where the parties have 
agreed to a particular sum and have not based that sum 
upon the lodestar -- which the majority acknowledges is 
clearly acceptable -- but as I have pointed out it also runs 
counter to the spirit of innovation that this Court has 
encouraged district courts to nurture when faced with 
varying situations.4 See, e.g., Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. (In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Similarly, had the district court informally suggested that PEDF and 
the School District meet outside of the district court's chambers and 
seek to settle the issue of attorneys' fees without court intervention, 
any 
agreed upon amount would have been valid despite the fact that 
traditional lodestar principles were not involved. The majority does not 
object to such an agreement, as the majority acknowledges that the 
lodestar approach is not always used in determining attorneys' fees: 
 
       [t]he instances in which courts may not have followed the lodestar 
       approach have been, as far as we know, instances where the parties 
       have reached an agreement as to the amount of the fee. Regrettably, 
       such a resolution was not reached in this case. 
 
Majority Op. at 8. Furthermore, the majority concludes by stating that 
"[i]t would be preferable were the parties to resolve the remaining issue 
by negotiation or mediation," id. at 12, neither of which is conditioned 
upon a lodestar calculus. See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 ("Ideally, of 
course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee.") 
 
4. Furthermore, there is authority to support a court's use of an 
"either/or" procedure in making a determination. See, e.g., Mobil Oil 
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re: Prudential Ins. Co.), Nos. 97-5155, 97-5156, 97-5217, 
97-5312, 1998 WL 409156, at 44 (3d Cir. July 23, 1998) 
(upholding as "appropriate" and "innovative" the district 
court's novel use of a bifurcated fee structure in large, 
nationwide class action suit). Indeed, as I have pointed out, 
the majority would have preferred that the parties had 
reached a fee agreement in this case, irrespective of 
whether that settlement would have been based upon the 
lodestar calculation. See n.3, supra.5 
 
Despite the majority's disapprobation, the protocol 
employed by the district court -- choosing one of the 
parties' proposals without modification -- is neither illegal 
nor radical. Such a dispute-resolving procedure has been 
used in major league baseball salary arbitrations with great 
success for nearly 25 years. See Roger I. Abrams, Legal 
Bases: Baseball and the Law 87-89 (Temple Univ. Press 
1998). Under baseball's salary arbitration scheme, a 
neutral arbitrator 
 
       selects either the final demand of the eligible player or 
       the final offer of the employing [baseball team]. The 
       arbitrator may not mediate or compromise . . . A greedy 
       player who sets his demand too high or a stingy club 
       that makes an offer too low is likely to lose . . . . 
 
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added). The author explains that not 
only does this system encourage settlement between the 
parties, but it also has the effect of bringing the salary offer 
and the player's demand closer together, as both sides 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Exploration Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n , 814 F.2d 998 (5th 
Cir. 1987), op. clarified by Mobil Oil Exploration Co. v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n, 814 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that venue 
was properly determined by the toss of a coin where the same proceeding 
was instituted in two circuits at the same). 
 
5. In light of the district court's "either/or" and "without modification" 
protocol, I make no comment about the lodestar's applicability to this 
case. I recognize, however, that the district court was of the view that 
it 
had adhered to a lodestar calculation, accepting PEDF's rate and hours 
up until January 31, 1995, the date that the district court determined 
the School District had been in compliance with the permit and effluent 
emissions allowed under its permit. 
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attempt to predict how the arbitrator will rule. See id. at 
88. Hence, just as district courts have been encouraged to 
employ alternative dispute resolution techniques, so too 
should they be encouraged to look to other disciplines and 
to employ other labor-saving techniques so as to adopt 
efficient, time-saving, and effective means of disposing of 
controversies and disputes. 
 
Thus, while I agree that a district court should employ a 
traditional lodestar analysis when the procedure or 
standard is disputed, I cannot agree that the lodestar 
calculation must be employed in every attorney fee 
determination that arises before the district court. Our 
jurisprudence is sufficiently flexible to allow for varied 
approaches, depending upon the circumstances of the case 
and the will of the parties. In my view, parties may by 
agreement or without objection, as they did here, utilize an 





In conclusion, I fear that the ramifications of this Court's 
decision transcend the issue of attorneys' fees and may 
have the effect of stifling innovative and non-traditional 
approaches to case and issue management in the district 
courts. If district courts cannot inaugurate a new procedure 
without the interference of this Court -- a procedure, I 
might add, that has never been declared illegal or improper 
by this or any other court until today -- then we will be 
guilty of discouraging the development of modern litigation 
techniques and practices in the face of ever increasing 
dockets and the sky-rocketing expense of litigation. By 
reversing the district court for using a different and novel 
protocol to which the parties acquiesced, the majority's 
decision may have the unfortunate effect of chilling district 
court innovation and efficient case management. 
 
I suggest that the majority here has turned this Court 
into a micro-manager. In so doing, it has unjustifiably 
permitted PEDF a "second bite at the apple" without PEDF 
ever having made known any objection to the district 
court's protocol. Accordingly, I would affirm the district 
court's February 13, 1997, order. 
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Because the majority has held otherwise, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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